University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
3-24-2005

Unleashing a Gatekeeper: Why the SEC Should Mandate
Disclosure of Details Concerning Directors' and Officers' Liability
Insurance Policies
Sean J. Griffith
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School (visiting 2004-2005), Associate Professor University of
Connecticut School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Securities Law Commons

Repository Citation
Griffith, Sean J., "Unleashing a Gatekeeper: Why the SEC Should Mandate Disclosure of Details
Concerning Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance Policies" (2005). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law.
62.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/62

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

UNLEASHING A GATEKEEPER: WHY THE SEC
SHOULD MANDATE DISCLOSURE OF DETAILS
CONCERNING DIRECTORS’ & OFFICERS’ LIABILITY
INSURANCE POLICIES
Sean J. Griffith*

ABSTRACT
This Essay explores the connection between corporate
governance and D&O insurance. It argues that D&O
insurers act as gatekeepers and guarantors of corporate
governance, screening and pricing corporate governance
risks to maintain the profitability of their risk pools. As a
result, D&O insurance premiums provide the insurer’s
assessment of a firm’s governance quality. Most basically,
firms with relatively worse corporate governance pay higher
D&O premiums. This simple relationship could signal
important information to investors and other capital market
participants. Unfortunately, the signal is not being sent.
Corporations lack the incentive to produce this disclosure
themselves, and U.S. securities regulators do not require
registrants to provide this information. This Essay therefore
advocates a change to U.S. securities regulation, making
disclosure of D&O policy details—specifically premiums,
limits and retentions under each type of insurance, as well as
the identity of the insurer—mandatory.
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GATEKEEPING

Much of the blame passed around after the recent spate of
corporate governance scandals has fallen ultimately on the
gatekeepers. Soon after the fall of Enron and WorldCom, Professor
Coffee wrote that “Enron is more about gatekeeper failure than board
failure.”1 Moreover, although gatekeepers can include a variety of
third-party intermediaries—including outside auditing firms, debt
rating agencies, equity analysts, investment bankers, and lawyers2—
most of the post-Enron attention has been focused on the role of the
outside auditor.3 In his prescription for fixing the gatekeeping crisis,
Professor Coffee ultimately joined others in advocating a regime of
strict liability for outside auditors, essentially converting the auditor
into an insurer of the company’s financial statements.4
1
John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid",
57 BUS. LAW. 1403, 1419 (2002).
2
Professor Coffee defines gatekeepers as “reputational intermediaries who provide
verification and certification services to investors.” Id. at 1405. See also Reinier H.
Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.
L. ECON. & ORG. 57, 57 (1986) (defining gatekeepers as “private parties who are
able to disrupt misconduct by withholding their cooperation from wrongdoers”).
3
Most, not all. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307,
116 Stat. 745, 7245 (2002) (adopting standards to increase the gatekeeping role of
outside counsel); Claire A. Hill, Rating Agencies Behaving Badly, 35 CONN. L. REV.
1145 (describing failure of debt ratings agencies to act as gatekeepers); Susan P.
Koniak, Corporate Fraud: See, Lawyers, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 195 (2003)
(arguing that a “lion-sized portion of blame” for Enron and other corporate
governance crises rests with lawyers).
4
See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure And Reform: The Challenge Of
Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U.L. REV. 301 (2004) (suggesting a form of
strict liability for auditors that would limit their exposure to a multiple of the highest
annual revenues the gatekeepers had recently received from the defrauding client).
Professor Coffee’s ultimate proposal is similar to a proposal previously made by
Professor Partnoy. See Frank Partnoy, Barbarians At The Gatekeepers?: A
Proposal For A Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 491 (2001);
Frank Partnoy, Strict Liability For Gatekeepers: A Reply To Professor Coffee, 84
B.U.L. REV. 365 (2004). Comparing his proposal to Professor Coffee’s, Professor
Partnoy has written:
The key to our proposals is the creation of a reinsurance market for securities
fraud risks, where gatekeepers would behave more like insurers. There are a
variety of ways to do this. Professor Coffee favors the use of caps based on a
multiple of the gatekeeper's revenues; I prefer limiting gatekeeper liability
through contracting based on a percentage of the issuer's liability.
Partnoy, 84 B.U.L. REV. at 375. Rather than converting the auditor into an insurer,
others have instead advanced a more direct insurance-market solution—Financial
Statement Insurance—and argued that companies ought to be able to choose
between financial statement auditing and financial statement insurance. See
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers: The Financial Statement
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Yet for all of the focus on the gatekeeping role of the outside
auditor, another potential gatekeeper has escaped notice. This is the
directors’ and officers’ (“D&O”) liability insurer. Although their
primary role is to spread the risk of loss from shareholder litigation,
not necessarily to provide the verification and certification services
expected of third-party gatekeepers, the D&O insurer has all the right
incentives to act as a corporate governance gatekeeper. Because a
firm’s risk of shareholder litigation corresponds to the firm’s
corporate governance, D&O insurers have every reason to become
experts at assessing corporate governance in order to evaluate and
ultimately charge for the risks they assume.5 The D&O insurer thus
serves as an accidental gatekeeper, guarding the entrance of its risk
pool by evaluating the governance quality of prospective insureds and
charging an appropriate premium to firms it agrees to insure.
The D&O insurer’s incentive to serve as a corporate governance
gatekeeper produces a simple but powerful hypothesis concerning the
relationship of D&O insurance to corporate governance: firms with
worse corporate governance pay higher D&O premiums than firms
with better corporate governance. A firm’s D&O coverage should
thus convey an important signal about the firm. Specifically, by
examining the firm’s premium, limits and retentions under each type
of coverage, as well as the identity of the primary insurer, investors
and other capital market participants should be able to learn the
insurer’s assessment of the quality of the firm’s corporate
governance.6
This Essay develops the governance-insurance hypothesis and
explores its implications and limitations. After this Introduction, Part
II evaluates the link between corporate governance and shareholder
litigation, arguing that even if shareholder litigation does not
necessarily lead to better corporate governance, better corporate
governance ought to lead to less shareholder litigation, which
provides D&O insurers with an adequate reason to concern
Insurance Alternative to Auditor Liability, 52 UCLA L. REV. 413 (2005); Joshua
Ronen, Post-Enron Reform: Financial Statement Insurance, and GAAP Re-visited, 8
STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 39 (2002).
5
Such expertise would be a product of competition against other D&O insurers
since those that are less able to predict the nature of the risks they underwrite face
adverse selection in their risk pools and, ultimately, claims costs significantly higher
than their more skilled competitors. George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons":
Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970)
(providing the classic account of adverse selection from the example of a used car
market).
6
A policy’s “limit” is the total amount of coverage—that is, the maximum amount
the insurer could be made to pay. The “retention,” also referred to as the
“deductible” is the portion of the claim that the insured must pay even if the
policy’s limits are not exhausted.
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themselves with corporate governance. Part III reviews the role and
function of D&O insurance in corporations, describing how D&O
insurance works and why corporations buy D&O insurance. Part IV
then examines the relationship between corporate governance and
D&O insurance, arguing that D&O insurers should and in fact do take
corporate governance into account when writing (and pricing) D&O
policies. As a result, Part IV concludes that a firm’s D&O coverage
should convey an important signal to investors and other capital
market participants. Unfortunately, as discussed in Part V, this signal
is not reaching the market. Corporations typically do not disclose the
details of their D&O policies and, in the United States unlike other
countries, no court or regulator makes them.
They should. Because basic D&O policy details could signal
important information to investors and thereby improve the efficiency
of the capital markets, this Essay argues that U.S. securities
regulations should be changed to require the disclosure of this
information. The SEC has sufficient authority to make this change
which, as described in Part V, would be technically simple and
unlikely to incur principled opposition. Moreover, the benefits of this
change are potentially large, effectively unleashing a new gatekeeper
in American corporate governance and triggering a flood of useful
information into the market. The Essay then closes, in Part VI, with a
brief summary and conclusion.

II. SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

The hypothesis that D&O insurers function as corporate
governance gatekeepers, signaling firm value through the D&O
premium depends, first, on the relationship between shareholder
litigation and corporation governance. As used in this Essay,
“shareholder litigation” refers to all claims covered under a D&O
policy, whether brought by a regulatory agency, a holder, purchaser,
or seller of a firm’s securities.7 The Essay gives a similarly expansive
definition to “corporate governance,” defining it broadly to refer to
any policies or structural mechanisms effecting management of the
firm.8 If there were no relationship between shareholder litigation and
7

See infra note 50 (defining “Claims” under a typical D&O policy).
This understanding of corporate governance does not limit it to specific
governance terms, typically found in charter or bylaw provisions, which have
generally been found to have an ambiguous effect on firm value. See, e.g., Lucian
Arye Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Allen Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate
Governance? Harvard Law & Economics Discussion Paper No. 491, available
online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=593423 (2004); Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus L.
8
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corporate governance, then the D&O insurer could not improve the
quality of its risk pool by evaluating a firm’s corporate governance
and, as a result, insurance premiums would have nothing more than a
random, accidental relationship to corporate governance. This Part
argues, however, that the relationship between corporate governance
and shareholder litigation is strong enough to support the insurer-asgatekeeper hypothesis.
Shareholder litigation, notwithstanding the breadth of the
definition I have given it, typically involves three types of claims:
shareholder derivative actions, shareholder direct actions, and
securities fraud claims.
Derivative suits—actions brought by
shareholders on the corporation’s behalf to recover for a manager’s
breach of duty—were once thought to exert an important constraint
on managerial agency costs.9 Now, however, a wide variety of
procedural obstacles enables boards to terminate such claims early
and at relatively low cost.10 In addition to the derivative suit, state
corporate law also allows shareholders to sue individually or as a
class when they can allege an injury that is not derivative of an injury
to the corporation.11 These claims, typically brought as class actions
Caylor, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance (2004); K.J.M. Cremers &
V.B. Nair, Governance Mechanisms And Equity Prices, Yale Working Paper
(2003); Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118
Q. J. ECON. 107 (2003). The correlation of D&O insurance pricing to specific
governance terms is outside of the scope of this paper and is the subject of an
empirical project that I am currently undertaking with my colleague Tom Baker.
9
See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949)
(stating that the derivative action “born of stockholder helplessness, was long the
chief regulator of corporate management” and noting the argument that “without it
there would be little practical check on such abuses”). This Article will refer to the
divergence in interests between management and shareholder interests as “agency
costs.” See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN.
ECON. 305 (1976) (identifying the divergence in interests between principal and
agent as a central feature of the separation of ownership and control).
10
These include the requirement that the plaintiffs make demand and, in some
states, post a bond for corporate defense costs. More broadly, procedural hurdles
include the business judgment rule and the ability of a special litigation committee
to wrest control of the litigation from the plaintiff. See generally N.Y. Bus. Corp.
Law §627 (requiring posting of a bond); Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207 (Del.
Supr. 1996) (discussing the demand requirement); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430
A.2d 779 (Del. Supr. 1981) (special committee); Auerbach v. Bennett, 419 N.Y.S.
2d 920 (1979) (special committee). These procedural obstacles reflect the widelyheld view that derivative litigation is a corporate nuisance, of value only to
plaintiffs’ attorneys, leading some to argue that the derivative action should be
abolished.
See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND
ECONOMICS 404-405 (2002).
11
See Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d at 1213 (discussing distinction between
derivative and direct claims).

UNLEASHING A GATEKEEPER

6

challenging board conduct in the context of takeovers or acquisition
transactions, have come to dominate state corporate law filings.12
They are not as easily terminated as derivative claims and, according
to some commentators, target precisely those transactions in which
agency costs are potentially highest.13 Finally, securities litigation
may be brought in many of the same situations that give rise to state
corporate law claims.14 Although these claims must be framed around
misrepresentations or inadequacies in corporate disclosure,15 the basic
concern—that company managers have misused their positions to the
disadvantage of their shareholders—is the same whether the
complaint is framed under corporate or securities law.16 The biggest
difference, it seems, is the potential for damages, with securities
litigation presenting by far the greatest liability threat to corporations
and their managers.17
12

See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder
Litigation: Acquistion-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 137 (2004)
(finding that approximately 80% of all fiduciary duty claims filed in Delaware
Chancery Court in 1999 and 2000 were class actions challenging board conduct in
an acquisition and that only 14% of fiduciary duty claims over the same period were
derivative suits).
13
See id., at 139 (arguing that “shareholder acquisition litigation polices those
management transactions with the highest potential for self-dealing”). Agency costs
may be high in both hostile and friendly acquisitions. See generally Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
975, 977-81 (arguing that boards should not be permitted to block hostile takeover
offers); Sean J. Griffith, Deal Protections in the Last Period of Play, 71 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1899, 1946 (2003) (arguing that the management team’s last period presents
agency costs and therefore the possibility of diversions from shareholder welfare
even in the context of negotiated acquisitions). But see Elliot J. Weiss & Lawrence
J. White, File Early, Then Free Ride: How Delaware Law (Mis)Shapes Shareholder
Class Actions, __ VAND. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2004) (finding that indications
of litigation agency costs are also present in acquisition-oriented class actions).
14
See Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate
Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 861 (2003)
(arguing that outside of the context of self-dealing and acquisitions “corporate
governance … has passed to federal law and in particular to shareholder litigation
under Rule 10b-5”).
15
See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-47 (1988) (allowing a 10b-5 claim
to survive dismissal on the basis of an allegation that shareholders sold at a price
reflecting the company’s false or misleading statements, thereby replacing
traditional notions of fraud with the “fraud-on-the-market” theory).
16
Thompson & Sale, supra note 14, at 903 (citing the concern “that management
has misused its position with respect to corporate assets”).
17
See, e.g., Elaine Buckberg, et. al., Recent Trends in Class Action Litigation: Bear
Market Cases Bring Big Settlements (NERA Economic Consulting 2005) (reporting
that the mean securities settlement increased by 33% in 2004 to $27.1 million and
stating that, although the median settlement fell slightly from $5.5 million to $5.3
million, the “increase in mean settlements cannot be explained by a handful of
extraordinary settlements”); Laura E. Simmons & Ellen M. Ryan, Post-Reform Act
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A long list of actions may give rise to one or more of these forms
of shareholder litigation. Knepper and Bailey, for example, provide a
170 item checklist of potential bases for liability with category
headings including “Governance, Management, and Business,”
“Informed Business Judgment,” “Unauthorized or Ultra Vires
Actions,” “Self-Dealing and Conflicts of Interest,” “Change of
Control Situations,” and “Disclosures.”18 The common theme
underlying all of these liability threats, however, is a corporate
structure that enables managers to act contrary to the best interests of
their shareholders. Whether shareholders bring a derivative claim
alleging a wealth transfer from shareholders to management, a direct
action claiming that an entrenched board has not acted to maximize
shareholder wealth in the context of a takeover, or a securities claim
alleging that managers misstated earnings in order to protect their
incentive compensation packages, the underlying cause is the failure
of the corporation to design a structure to constrain its managers from
acting to benefit themselves at the expense of their shareholders.19
Good governance ought to lead to less litigation. Corporate
governance constraints may prevent managers from deviating from
shareholder interests and thus triggering shareholder claims.
Alternately, even if it cannot prevent managerial opportunism,
corporate governance mechanisms may enable its detection and
eradication, thereby limiting the total loss to shareholders and,
ultimately, the cost of litigation.20 In other words, insofar as defective
corporate governance underlies all forms of shareholder litigation,
better governance ought to translate into less litigation or, at least, less
costly claims.
The assertion that better governance leads to less litigation is not
the same as the assertion that that litigation will lead to better
governance. Indeed, there is considerable doubt concerning the latter
proposition. In an influential study of derivative litigation, for
example, Professor Romano concluded that “shareholder litigation is

Securities Lawsuits: Settlements Reported Through December 2003, at 4
(Cornerstone Research 2004) (reporting that average securities claims costs have
tripled since 1997). The higher recoveries in securities litigation may reflect the
fact that there are fewer procedural hurdles in the way of securities plaintiffs in
comparison to corporate law plaintiffs. See supra note 10.
18
WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS
th
AND DIRECTORS, 7 ed., at §17.02.
19
The same harm may thus give rise to a claim under corporate law, whether
derivative or direct, and securities law. See Thompson & Sale, supra note 14
(noting this overlap).
20
See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 47-48
(1996) (discussing costs of opportunism).
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a weak, if not ineffective, instrument of corporate governance.”21
Relatedly, in a famous study of securities class action settlements,
Professor Alexander concluded that the merits do not matter in the
settlement of securities claims.22 The core concern driving both
analyses can be characterized as “litigation agency costs”—that is, the
divergence between the interests of the plaintiffs’ attorney controlling
the litigation and the shareholder plaintiffs that the attorney
supposedly represents.23 This disconnect leads plaintiffs’ lawyers
both to file claims that shareholders would prefer not to press,24 and to
settle claims that shareholders would prefer to pursue.25 Litigation
agency costs thus distort the ability of shareholder litigation to check
managerial agency costs.26
21

Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 55, 84 (1991).
22
Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements of
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991).
23
See Alexander, supra note 22, at 500 (citing “the economic incentives of litigation
decisionmakers” as a core cause of the failure of settlements to follow the merits of
the claim); Romano, supra note 21, at 57 (“attorneys’ incentives are the key factor
in shareholder litigation”). Accord John C. Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion: The
Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 5 (1985).
24
See, e.g., Elliot Weiss & John Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring:
How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions,
104 YALE L. J. 2053, 2060-64 (1995) (describing the plaintiffs’ lawyers practice of
rushing to the courthouse any time a dip in stock price can be tied to a piece of bad
news).
25
See Romano, supra note 21, at 61 (supporting hypothesis that plaintiffs’ attorneys
are willing to settle for attorneys’ fees but recovery to shareholders by finding that
although only half of the settlements in her sample resulted in any recovery to
shareholders, 90% awarded attorneys’ fees). On the question of when, according to
shareholders’ best interests, shareholder litigation should be pursued, see Reinier
Kraakman, Hyun Park & Steven Shavell, When Are Shareholder Suits in
Shareholder Interests, 82 GEO. L. J. 1733 (1994).
26
See generally Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class
Actions, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1487 (1996); Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg,
Solving the Nuisance-Value Settlement Problem: Mandatory Summary Judgment,
90 VA. L. REV. 1849 (2004); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic
Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (1991); Adam J.
Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with
Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925 (1999); See also
authors cited at supra note 23. The problem of litigation agency costs also shaped
the reforms adopted in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. See
Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C. 77-78). D&O insurance arguably exacerbates these distortions by
effectively releasing directors and officers from the threat of personal liability. See
James D. Cox, Private Litigation and the Deterrence of Corporate Misconduct, 60
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 1, 21-37 (1997) (weighing arguments that insurance
undercuts the deterrence effects of shareholder litigation).
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Skepticism that shareholder litigation operates as an effective
governance constraint should not, however, be taken as reason to
doubt that effective corporate governance will lead to less shareholder
litigation.27 Litigation agency costs disrupt the causal connection
between litigation and governance, but not necessarily the link
between governance and litigation. The distortion of litigation agency
costs arises only after conduct giving rise to a potential claim has
taken place, at which point plaintiffs’ lawyers may pursue nuisance
suits and settle valid claims so that the ultimate result bears little
relation to the socially optimal sanction for the conduct.28 Corporate
governance mechanisms, by contrast, operate before the harmful
conduct has occurred. Because corporate governance operates at a
level prior to the introduction of litigation agency costs and may
prevent the harm from ever taking place, corporate governance has a
more direct impact on shareholder litigation than shareholder
litigation does on corporate governance.29 Stated most concisely,
better corporate governance should lead to less shareholder litigation
regardless of whether shareholder litigation leads to better corporate
governance.
In order to advance the insurance-as-gatekeeper hypothesis, this
Essay need only claim that better governance leads to less litigation,
not that litigation leads to better governance. Scholarship focusing on
the problem of litigation agency costs has drawn the latter conclusion
into doubt, but not the former. Insurers therefore retain strong
incentives to inquire into the strength of a firm’s corporate
governance in underwriting its D&O policy.

27

Skepticism on this later point would tend to lead to the cynical view that
shareholder litigation is essentially random, unable to serve either a compensatory
or deterrence function, and therefore ought to be abolished. See generally James D.
Cox, Compensation, Deterrence and the Market as Boundaries for Derivative Suit
Procedures, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 745 (1984) (noting that deterrence seems to
dominate compensatory objectives in derivative suits); Reinier H. Kraakman,
Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L. J. 857,
865 (1984) (noting the essential deterrence function of shareholder litigation).
28
See generally Kraakman et al., supra note 25, at 1741 (arguing that shareholders
would like suits to be brought only when the suit would increase share value as
measured by deterrence benefits plus expected recoveries minus litigation expenses
and ex ante salary and insurance adjustments).
29
The problem may be conceptualized on a three-point timeline, placing in order:
(1) the firm’s initial governance structure, (2) shareholder litigation, and (3) the
firm’s later governance structure. Because litigation agency costs arise with the
litigation, they disrupt the causal chain between points 2 and 3, not between points 1
and 2. A firm’s initial governance structure should effect shareholder litigation at
point 2 regardless of whether litigation at point 2 effects the firm’s governance
structure at point 3.
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III.THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF DIRECTORS’ & OFFICERS’ LIABILITY
INSURANCE
Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance arose in the 1950s
and 1960s as a species of the general liability policies that insurers
had long marketed.30 The first D&O policies were not well adapted to
the special context of corporate litigation, leaving gaps in coverage
and, because they seemed to clash with public policy objectives,
raising issues of enforceability.31 The troubling public policy
question was whether a corporation could insure its managers against
losses for which it could not legally indemnify them.32 Although
commentators had argued that insurance payments should not be
allowed in any circumstance where indemnification was illegal,33
30

See Joseph F. Johnston, Jr., Corporate Indemnification and Liability Insurance
for Directors and Officers, 33 BUS. LAW. 1993 (1978) (“Although [D&O] policies
have been marketed since the 1950s, the coverage had little attention until the mid1960s.”). Accord Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., New Cure for an Old Ailment: Insurance
Against Directors’ and Officers’ Liability, 22 BUS. LAW. 92, 103 (1966) (noting that
the author had written four years earlier that directors and officers “do not
commonly insure themselves against the expenses of litigation arising out of their
corporate status” but that since that time insurers had found a highly receptive
market for D&O insurance, representing “a violent new twist” on the older problem
of the propriety of indemnification payments).
31
Professor Bishop quipped:
Perusal of the Lloyd’s form and its American imitations leaves me with a distinct
impression that the draughtsman, though possessed of broad and solid experience
in the field of insurance law, got his corporation law from some rather sketchy
recollections of Business Units I (or whatever they happened to call the basic
corporation course at his law school) and a quick glance at Corpus Juris.
22 BUS. LAW. 92, at 103.
32
See id., at 106.
33
See id., at 107 (arguing that “where the applicable statute flatly prohibits
indemnification inconsistent with its terms, it seems to me plainly illegal for the
corporation to pay for insurance against expenses, such as payments to the
corporation to compensate it for a breach of duty to it”) and 109-110 (arguing that
because “courts would never allow a corporation to indemnify an insider against
amounts paid the corporation in settlement or satisfaction of judgment” of a claim
for breach of fiduciary duty, the same criteria should be applied “to the
corporation’s payment for insurance which may operate to relieve the insider of
such liability”). See also Joseph W. Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New
Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L. J.
1078, 1087 (1967) (arguing that “an insurance policy paid for by the corporation
whose effect was to free corporate managers from the fear of civil liability for
breach of their duty to show good faith in their dealings with the corporation” would
violated public policy); Note, Indemnification of Directors: The Problems Posed by
Federal Securities and Antitrust Legislation, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1403, 1428 (1963)
(arguing that “insurance in its present for should be voided as contrary to public
policy wherever it would free the director from a burden from which he could not
be freed by indemnification”); Note, Public Policy and Directors’ Liability
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state legislators ultimately mooted the argument by passing statutes
that expressly allowed corporations to purchase and maintain D&O
insurance even against those losses that the corporation could not
itself indemnify.34
D&O insurance thus operates as a contractual mechanism to
spread the risk of shareholder litigation.35 It moves the risk from
individual directors and officers to the corporation they manage and
then to a third-party insurer, with the ultimate result that individual
managers are almost never saddled with personal liability for causing
corporate losses.36 If the shareholders sue, the corporation or its
insurer pays. This Part offers a close examination of this insurance
arrangement.

Insurance, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 716, 719 (1967) (arguing that insurance against
breach of the duty of loyalty is contrary to public policy even if paid by the director
himself).
34
For example, Delaware General Corporate Law §145(g) provides:
A corporation shall have power to purchase and maintain insurance on behalf of
any person who is or was a director, officer, employee or agent of the
corporation… against any liability asserted against such person and incurred by
such person in any such capacity, or arising out of such person's status as such,
whether or not the corporation would have the power to indemnify such person
against such liability under this section.
DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 8, 145(g) (2004). See also JOSEPH WARREN BISHOP, JR., THE
LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS: INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE
§8.01 (revised edition, 1998) (“All states authorize the corporation to purchase and
maintain insurance on behalf of directors and officers against liabilities incurred in
such capacities, whether or not the corporation would have the power to indemnify
against such liabilities.”).
35
Although employment litigation plays a large role in D&O coverage for smaller
companies, it does not for larger firms. See Tillinghast 2003 Directors and Officers
Liability Survey: Executive Summary of U.S. and Canadian Results, at 7 (2004)
(reporting that “91% of the claims against nonprofit [companies] were brought by
employees, while only 24% of claims against for-profit companies with greater than
500 shareholders were brought by employees”). Because the focus of this Article is
on publicly traded companies, it focuses on shareholder litigation and not
employment litigation as the primary source of litigation risk for D&O insurance.
36
See Bernard S. Black, Brian R. Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director
Liability, Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 250 (2003).
Recent settlements involving WorldCom and Enron compel the “almost”
qualification. See Gretchen Morgenson, Ex-Directors at WorldCom Settle Anew,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2005) (describing agreement according to which former
WorldCom directors will personally contribute to settlement amount). On the
difficulties of reaching personal assets rather than insurance assets in the ordinary
tort context, see Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money and the Moral Economy of
Tort Law in Action, 35 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 275, 277 (2001).
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A. How D&O Insurance Works
The general label “D&O insurance” is often applied to three
distinct insurance arrangements. First, there is coverage to protect
individual managers from the risk of shareholder litigation. Second,
there is coverage to reimburse the corporation for its indemnification
obligations. And third, there is coverage to protect the corporation
from the risk of shareholder litigation to which the corporate entity
itself is a party. The first two aspects of D&O coverage trace to the
original Lloyd’s of London D&O form.37 The third form of coverage
is a newer development. A D&O insurance package may consist of
these forms of coverage in any proportion.
The only form of D&O insurance that actually insures individual
directors and officers is referred to within the industry as “Side A
coverage.”38 Side A coverage essentially provides that the insurer
will pay covered losses on behalf of managers when the corporation
itself does not indemnify its managers.39 Covered losses include
compensatory damages, settlement amounts, and legal fees incurred
by the individual in connection with her service as a director or
officer of the corporation.40

37

The original Lloyd’s form contained two policies, “ALS(D4)” and “ALS(D5),”
one for individual coverage and one for corporate coverage. See Joseph Hinsey, et
al., What Existing D&O Policies Cover, 27 BUS. LAW. 147, 150 (1972) (“In a
documentary sense there are indeed two policies, designated … as ALS(D4) and
ALS(D5) and bearing different policy numbers as issued.”).
38
The types of coverage are named in reference to the insurance documents listing
the respective rights and obligations. Side A coverage relates to “Insuring
Agreement A,” Side B coverage to “Insuring Agreement B,” and so on.
39
Typical policy language provides:
Except for Loss which the Insurer pays pursuant to Insuring Agreement B of this
Policy, the Insurer will pay on behalf of the Directors and Officers Losses which
the Directors and Officers shall become legally obligated to pay as a result of a
Claim first made during the Policy Period or Discovery Period, if applicable,
against the Directors and Officers for a Wrongful Act which takes place during
or prior to the Policy Period.
The Hartford, Directors, Officers and Company Liability Policy, Specimen DO 00
R292 00 0696, § I.A. [hereinafter, Hartford Specimen Policy]. The effect of the
carve out for losses paid pursuant to Insuring Agreement B is to prevent the
managers from being paid twice for the same loss.
40
Id. at §IV.J. (including compensatory damages, settlement amounts, and legal
fees). Other important definitions in the policy include “claims,” defined as the
receipt of a written demand for relief, the filing of a civil proceeding, or the
commencement of a formal administrative or regulatory proceeding. Id., at §IV.A.
Wrongful acts are defined by the policy to include errors, misstatements, omissions,
and breaches of duty committed by directors and officers in their official capacities
as well as any other claim against the directors and officers solely by reason of their
position. Id. at § IV.O.
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The second form of D&O coverage, “Side B coverage,” does not
protect individual managers at all but rather reimburses the
corporation for indemnifying its directors and officers.41 Payments
under Side B coverage are thus triggered when the corporation incurs
an obligation to indemnify its managers, which most policies deem to
be required in every case where a corporation is legally permitted to
do so.42 Together, Side A and B coverage allocate the risk of loss
from shareholder litigation as follows. First, when a company is
legally permitted to indemnify its managers for their liabilities, as it
generally is, it must do so.43 Second, when a company does
indemnify its managers, the insurer will reimburse the company

41

Typical policy language provides:
The Insurer will pay on behalf of the Company Losses for which the Company
has, to the extent permitted or required by law, indemnified the Directors and
Officers, and which the Directors and Officers have become legally obligated to
pay as a result of a Claim … against the Directors and Officers for a Wrongful
Act….
Id. at §I.B.
42
Id. at §VI.F (providing that if a corporation is legally permitted to indemnify its
officers and directors, its organizational documents will be deemed to require it to
do so). When a corporation that is legally able to indemnify its directors and
officers refuses to do so, the insurer would remain obligated under the policy’s Side
A coverage, but the obligation would be subject to the (higher) Side B retention as
well as a coinsurance percentage). Id. This presumptive indemnification aspect of
the D&O policy is aimed at preventing the possibility of opportunism, where a
corporation refuses to indemnify solely to cause the payment obligation to fall on
the insurer.
43
Although most state corporate law codes broadly permit indemnification, many
states, including Delaware, do not allow indemnification for settlements (or
judgments) in derivative litigation on the theory that such awards benefit the
company and are paid, minus the chunk awarded to the plaintiffs’ attorneys, into the
corporate treasury. See DGCL §145(a) (permitting indemnification for expenses,
judgments, and settlements for actions except those “by or in right of the
corporation”). Because derivative litigation is asserted by shareholders in the
corporation’s name, it is an action “by or in right of the corporation.” To allow
indemnification in such situations would be circular: the director paying the
settlement to the corporation only to be given back the same amount by the
corporation as indemnification. See generally Joseph P. Monteleone & Nicholas J.
Conca, Directors and Officers Indemnification and Liability Insurance, 51 BUS.
LAW. 573, 580 (1996) (“The theory is that the corporation would be indemnifying
the director or officer for a settlement ultimately paid to the corporation itself as
plaintiff. Certain state legislatures, including Delaware’s, have determined that
such circularity of payment is unacceptable.”) (citation omitted). Delaware does,
however, permit corporations to indemnify directors for defense costs incurred by
directors and officers in reaching settlement or judgment. DGCL §145(b). Finally,
although the SEC has long maintained that indemnification for securities law claims
is contrary to public policy, it is firmly established that the settlement of federal
securities law claims may be indemnified. See, e.g., Raychem Corp. v. Federal Ins.
Co., 853 F. Supp. 1170 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
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pursuant to the terms of its Side B coverage.44 Third, when a
company is not legally permitted to indemnify its directors and
officers, as in the settlement of derivative actions, the insurer will pay
pursuant to the company’s Side A coverage.45
The result of all of this is that an insurer’s Side A coverage
obligations are triggered principally when liabilities arise from the
settlement of derivative litigation or when the company is insolvent.
Otherwise, and in the vast majority of cases, the liability falls on the
corporation in the form of an indemnification obligation to its
managers.46 Side B coverage then shifts this liability, albeit at a
higher retention, to the third-party insurer.47 The basis for both forms
of coverage, it is important to note, is the appearance of a claim
against the company’s managers. Neither Side A nor Side B coverage
is available to cover liabilities that the corporation itself may have to a
party in any given action.
Side C coverage emerged to fill this void. Evolving first as a
solution to the disputes between insurance companies and corporate
defendants over what portion of a securities settlement ought to be
allocated to the managers (and therefore reimbursed by the insurer
under the corporation’s Side B coverage) versus to the corporation
(and therefore uncovered and paid directly by the corporation),48 Side
44

Side B coverage has higher retentions than Side A coverage, which may have no
retention at all. See Hartford Specimen Policy, §VI.F. and Declarations Items D
(retentions).
45
A slight wrinkle arises when a corporation’s legal ability to indemnify diverges
from its financial capacity to do so. Most policies resolve this issue by creating a
“financial insolvency” exception to the presumptive indemnification provision
which requires the insurer to reimburse individual managers under Side A of the
policy when the corporation is financially unable to indemnify them. See Hartford
Specimen Policy §VI.F. (providing Financial Insolvency exception); §IV.G.
(defining financial insolvency as the status resulting from the appointment of a
receiver, liquidator, or trustee to supervise or liquidate the company or the company
becoming a debtor in possession). These provisions allow managers of insolvent
firms to collect insurance proceeds without becoming subject to the higher retention
amounts and coinsurance payments required when a corporation otherwise refuses
to indemnify.
46
Don A. Bailey, Side-A Only Coverage, Feb. 11, 2004 (unpublished manuscript on
file with author) (reporting that “the vast majority of Claims covered under a D&O
Policy are indemnified by the Company”).
47
See supra note 44.
48
See, e.g., Nordstrom, Inc. v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 54 F.3d 1424 (9th Cir. 1995)
(recognizing the insurer’s right to allocation unless insurer has improperly refused
to defend the insured or has made no claim to separate the portion of the settlement
for which it was liable); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of
Pittsburgh, 64 F.3d 1282 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying “larger settlement rule,” entitling
corporation to reimbursement of all settlement costs where corporation’s liability is
purely derivative of liability of insured officers and directors) ; First Fidelity

UNLEASHING A GATEKEEPER

15

C coverage moots the allocation issue by insuring the corporation
itself against direct claims.49 Typical policy language provides:
[T]he Insurer will pay on behalf of the Company Loss which
the Company shall become legally obligated to pay as a
result of a Securities
Claim… against the Company for a
Wrongful Act…50
To ensure that the company retains some “skin in the game” at
settlement, insurers may insist on a higher retention amount for Side
C claims as well as a significant co-insurance percentage.51 Still, Side
C coverage is the final step in the process of shifting the cost of
shareholder litigation to a third party insurer.
Although each of these arrangements—Side A, B, and C
coverage—may be referred to generally as D&O insurance, the
collective label may be misleading since only Side A coverage insures
the directors and officers. Side B and Side C coverages are for the
corporation. Nevertheless, referring to the arrangement as a whole as
D&O insurance underscores the broader point that corporations buy
insurance packages. Pure Side A (or B or C) coverage is rare.
Coverage types are mixed to achieve the distinct insurance goals of:
(1) protecting managers from personal liability for shareholder
litigation, (2) protecting the company from indirect liability, through
its indemnification obligations, for shareholder litigation, and (3)
Bancorp v. Nat’l Union, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS3977, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30,
1994) (“[B]oth the directors and officers as well as the corporate entity faced
liability in the underlying litigation. The mere fact that liability arises exclusively
from the conduct of the insured… does not provide a basis for the insurer to be
responsible for the liability of those who are uninsured.”); PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cont’l
Cas. Co., 640 F. Supp. 656, 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (addressing the issue of allocation
between covered and non-covered parties and holding that the insurer bore the
burden of proving that the ultimate allocation was reasonable in light of the
“relative exposures” of the parties). See also Monteleone, Bailey & McCarrick,
Allocation of Defense Costs and Settlements Under D&O Policies, INSIGHTS, Vol.
5, No. 11 (Nov. 1991).
49
See Monteleone & Conca, supra note 43, at 618-20 (noting the various responses
of insurers to the problem of allocation disputes, including predetermined allocation
agreements and entity coverage).
50
Hartford Specimen Policy, §I.C. A securities claim is defined in the policy to
include claims by securities holders alleging a violation of the Securities Act of
1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or rules and regulations promulgated
pursuant to either act as well as similar state laws and includes claims “arising from
the purchase or sale of, or offer to purchase or sell, any Security issued by the
company” regardless of whether the transaction is with the company or over the
open market. Id. at §IV.M. If the company purchases Side C coverage, the
definitions of “claim,” “loss,” and “wrongful act” expand to include the company
and not just the directors and officers.
51
See Hartford Specimen Policy, Declarations Page, Item D (providing for separate
retention amount for A, B, and C coverage) and E (providing for coinsurance
percentages for securities claims).

UNLEASHING A GATEKEEPER

16

protecting the company from direct liability from securities litigation.
What all of these goals have in common, however, is the shifting of
risk from shareholder litigation, in whole or in part, to a third party
insurer.

B. Why Corporations Buy D&O Insurance
The vast majority of American public companies—a proportion
consistently reported at well over 90%—buy D&O insurance.52 This
presents a puzzle. Insurance, after all, is not free. Insurance
premiums reflect not only the policy’s risk—an actuarially
determined probability of loss—but also a loading fee reflecting the
insurer’s costs and profits.53 This means that it always costs more to
buy insurance for a risk than to bear it oneself.54 Moreover, unlike
individuals, for whom third-party insurance may be the only available
means of spreading risk, corporations are themselves sophisticated
risk-shifting mechanisms, ultimately allocating the risk of business
failure to shareholders whose losses, thanks to limited liability, cannot
exceed the extent of their investment.
Furthermore, because
shareholders can spread this risk costlessly (or nearly so) by holding a
diversified portfolio of stocks, it is a puzzle why corporations buy
insurance at all. Why would corporations pay extra for something
that their shareholders can get for free in the capital markets?
For basic property and casualty insurance, economists have
largely answered this question.55 First, features of the tax code,
52

Tillinghast 2003 Directors and Officers Liability Survey, supra note 35, at fig. 3
(showing that since 1997 90% or more of U.S. respondents have purchased D&O
insurance, with 97% of U.S. respondents purchasing coverage in 2003).
53
KARL BORCH, ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE 13-15, 163 (1990) (describing the
insurance premium as the sum of the expected claim payment under the insurance
contract, the administrative expenses of the insurance company and the reward to
the insurer for bearing the risk, later referring to the difference between expected
claims payments and the insurance premium as the “loading” of the contract).
54
As a result, it is thought to be rational for individuals to purchase insurance only
for very large potential losses that, if incurred, would significantly diminish their
quality of life and irrational to insure against small losses—by buying extended
consumer warranties, for example—that one could easily bear oneself. [CITATION
PENDING]
55
Mayers and Smith addressed this puzzle in a series of articles. See generally
David Mayers & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., On the Corporate Demand for Insurance,
55 J. BUS. 281 (1982); David Mayers & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., On the Corporate
Demand for Insurance: Evidence from the Reinsurance Market, 63 J. Bus. 19
(1990); David Mayers & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Corporate Insurance and the
Underinvestment Problem, 54 J. RISK & INS. 45 (1987). See also Richard MacMinn
& James Garven, On Corporate Insurance, in HANDBOOK OF INSURANCE 541.
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including the availability of deductions for insurance premiums but
not for internal reserves,56 create incentives for corporations to
purchase insurance rather than to self-insure.57 In addition, because
transaction costs in bankruptcy are high,58 creditors and shareholders
alike may prefer that the corporation purchase insurance against large
potential losses in order to keep the firm out of bankruptcy.59
Creditors may also insist that corporations insure major assets in order
to protect the security of their loans.60 Some forms of property and
casualty coverage may thus add value to the corporation.
These explanations, however, do not apply to the purchase of
D&O insurance. Although there may still be some tax advantage to
buying insurance over reserving, such advantages shrink with the size
of coverage. Because D&O policies and premiums are smaller than
property and casualty coverages, the relevant tax deductions as well
as the costs associated with creating self-insurance reserves are also
smaller.61 Similarly, because likely D&O losses are a fraction of
potential losses under a general property and casualty policy, they
pose less of a bankruptcy threat.62 Finally, there is no evidence that
creditors insist on D&O insurance as a condition for making corporate
loans. All of which suggests that the corporate benefits from the
purchase of D&O insurance are considerably smaller than the
corporate benefits from the purchase of basic property and casualty
insurance.
The costs, however, remain the same.63
The
predominance of D&O insurance therefore is all the more puzzling.64
Still, at least one aspect of the corporate purchase of D&O
insurance is easy to explain. Recall that D&O insurance has two
parts—Side A, benefiting individual managers, and Sides B and C,
56

[CITE IRC. CONFIRM ACCURACY.]
See Mayers & Smith, Demand, supra note 55, at 289-91, 294-95 (describing and
modeling tax incentives for corporate insurance purchases); MacMinn & Garven,
Corporate Insurance, supra note 55, at 557-60 (same).
58
See J. B. Warner, Bankruptcy Costs: Some Evidence, 32 J. FIN. 337 (1977).
59
See Mayers & Smith, Demand, supra note 55, at 284-85; MacMinn & Garven,
Corporate Insurance, supra note 55, at 548-50.
60
See Mayers & Smith, Demand, supra note 55, at 287 (noting that “[b]ond
indentures frequently contain covenants requiring the firm to maintain certain types
of insurance coverage”); MacMinn & Garven, Corporate Insurance, supra note 55,
at 550-57 (modeling corporate insurance as a means to mitigate agency problems
between corporate managers and bondholders).
61
[CITATION COMPARING SIZES OF GENERAL CORPORATE
POLICIES V. D&O POLICIES]
62
[NOTE SAYING WHY AND PROVIDING STATISTICS TO SUPPORT]
63
The cost of coverage includes a loading fee that is proportional to the total
amount of coverage. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
64
See supra note 52 and accompanying text (noting that over 95% of American
corporations purchase D&O insurance).
57
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benefiting the corporation itself. Because Side A coverage protects
individuals, it can be justified on the basis of individual risk
aversion.65 Corporate managers insist on D&O insurance to protect
their personal wealth from the risk of shareholder litigation, making
such coverage necessary to attract qualified persons to board service
and executive-level employment.66 Side A coverage is thus explained
as an aspect of the individual’s compensation package, a cost that the
labor market has allocated to the employer.67 However, this is not a
complete explanation for D&O insurance. It does not explain why
corporations also purchase coverage, under Side B and C of the
policy, for the corporation itself.
Indeed, entity-level coverage for the risk of shareholder litigation
is particularly puzzling since the corporation controls the governance
processes that create litigation risk. Because corporations can
mitigate this litigation risk by improving their governance structure
and shareholders can eliminate the risk of business failure by holding
a diversified portfolio, the party in the best position to bear the risk of
shareholder litigation would seem to be the corporation itself.68
Moreover, once the loading fees associated with D&O insurance are
taken into account, the costs of entity-level coverage appear to
outweigh the benefits. Entity-level D&O insurance, in other words,
appears to be a negative net present value investment. Why, then, do
corporations buy it?

65
See generally PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS, 207209 (17th ed. 2001) (describing risk-aversion and its relationship to the diminishing
marginal utility of income).
66
Participants in the insurance market cite this as the basic explanation for D&O
insurance. See, e.g., Randy Parr, Directors and Officers Insurance, in D&O
LIABILITY INSURANCE 2004: DIRECTORS & OFFICERS UNDER FIRE 13 (PLI 2004)
(reporting that “it is difficult for corporations to attract and keep outside directors”).
67
Coverage for individual directors and officers was recognized as an aspect of
compensation early in the evolution of D&O insurance. See, e.g., Johnston, supra
note 30, at 2013 (stating that the fact that the corporation paid D&O premiums “was
nothing more than another form of compensation for the executives and another
way of attracting capable managers”). Interestingly, the first D&O policies
allocated a portion of the premium, usually 10%, to the individual insured. See
Wallace, More on Sitting Ducks: (Officers and Directors, That Is), INSURANCE,
April 16, 1966, 32, 36 (describing then-typical “ration of 90% of the premium to the
corporation and 10% to the officers and directors”). This aspect of the policy has
been discontinued, presumably because individual directors and officers asked for
and received corporate payment of the full premium.
68
Although D&O insurance may guarantee a recovery ex post for shareholders who
sue a bankrupt or insolvent firm, ex ante shareholders could more efficiently
manage the risk of corporate bankruptcy by holding a diversified portfolio of shares.
The diversification point similarly moots arguments regarding the insurer’s
efficiencies in claims administration.
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If the purchase of entity-level D&O insurance is not a sensible
investment for the firm, it may nevertheless serve the interests of the
firm’s managers. Managers who, unlike diversified shareholders,
have a significant personal stake in the firm they manage, have a
greater personal incentive to avoid corporate-level losses.69 Even if
losses are unlikely to lead to insolvency (and manager
unemployment), they may still impact corporate assets and earnings,
drawing unwelcome scrutiny from the capital markets including,
perhaps, a challenge to the management of the firm.70 More directly,
losses resulting in a reduction in the firm’s earnings are likely to have
an impact on the managers’ compensation. The probable losses from
shareholder litigation are in precisely this category—too small to
jeopardize the solvency of the firm, but large enough to put
management’s paycheck at risk. This may go a long way towards
explaining the purchase of entity-level D&O insurance.
Managers may purchase entity-level D&O coverage because their
compensation packages are based on accounting measures of
performance, especially earnings, and because shareholder litigation
is likely to have a direct adverse impact on corporate earnings.71
Entity-level D&O insurance allows managers to avoid these shocks to
earnings.72 By buying D&O insurance, managers essentially trade
69

As a general matter, this incentive arrangement is good for shareholders since
managers that seeks to avoid losses obviously benefits shareholders’ portfolios
overall. In this one instance, however, because using D&O insurance to avoid
corporate level losses is a negative net present value investment, shareholder and
manager interests are not aligned.
70
The challenge may be in the form of a proxy fight or an unwanted takeover bid.
See generally Henry Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J.
POL. ECON. 110, 112 (1965); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper
Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1164 (1981); Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case
Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981); Michael
C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific
Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 6 (1983). Significant reductions in earnings or assets
may also result in a credit downgrade. See, e.g., Claire A. Hill, Regulating the
Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43, 79 (2004) (describing how credit ratings
work and what they signal to the market).
71
See generally LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE:
THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004) (detailing defects
in the design of executive compensation packages that lead to similarly distorted
incentives).
72
In addition, a positive externality (from the managers’ point of view) of this
system may be that shareholder litigation becomes a less noteworthy event since it
is handled almost exclusively by the third party insurer and rarely threatens the
corporation itself. This may not be the case if corporations had to handle this
litigation by itself. Because the corporation’s risk of loss from any claim would
thus be substantially higher, shareholder attention might be more focused on the
company each time a shareholder claim arose.
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large but infrequent expected losses for smaller annual costs in order
to smooth earnings volatility.73 Entity-level coverage, in other words,
is a form of earnings management. Managers buy it to protect their
compensation in spite of the fact that it is a negative net present value
investment for the corporation. In this way, entity level D&O
coverage is a paradigmatic example of agency costs—the dislocation
between shareholder and manager incentives.74
Why, then, do corporations buy D&O insurance? The answer to
this question, it seems, has two parts. First, corporations buy Side A
coverage in order to attract risk averse individuals to their boardrooms
and executive suites. The second part of the answer is more complex
and, perhaps, more sinister. Corporations buy entity-level coverage
under Side B and C of the D&O policy because they are run by selfish
managers who are willing to invest corporate assets in negative net
present value projects in order to protect their own compensation
packages.

IV.D&O INSURANCE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Once corporations purchase D&O insurance, regardless
ultimately of why they buy it, the risk of shareholder litigation is
shifted, in whole or in part, to a third party insurer. Given the
relationship between corporate governance and shareholder
litigation,75 the insurer subjects its capital reserves to risks largely
determined by the insured’s corporate governance. The implications
of this relationship between D&O insurance and governance risk are
explored in this Part.

73

See Buckberg, et. al., supra note 17 (reporting that the mean securities settlement
in 2004 was $27.1 million, while the median settlement was $5.3 million).
74
Accord John M.R. Chalmers, et al., Managerial Opportunism? Evidence from
Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance Purchases, 57 J. FIN. 609, 610-11 (2002)
(investigating the hypothesis that managers are willing to buy large amounts of
D&O coverage at high premiums because they receive all of the benefits of the
coverage but bear the costs only in proportion to their fractional ownership of the
firm’s equity and finding, in a sample of IPO-stage firms, that “managers choos[e]
abnormally high D&O insurance coverage based on their belief that their shares are
priced too high”); John E. Core, On the Corporate Demand for Directors’ and
Officers’ Insurance, 64 J. RISK & INS. 63, 81 (1997) (investigating the hypothesis
that more entrenched managers are more likely to purchase D&O insurance and
finding, in a sample of Canadian firms, that the “firms with higher excess director
pay… are more likely to carry D&O insurance coverage and purchase higher
limits,” suggesting that managers bundle compensation and insurance because they
do not internalize the cost of either).
75
See supra Part II.
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A. Pricing the Policy: Correlating Corporate Governance and D&O
Liability Risk
Insurance companies are experts at assessing risk. Because the
success of an insurer’s business depends upon taking in more capital
than it pays out, the insurer must develop an ability to assess the
probable payout obligations of each exposure and then charge an
appropriate premium for the risk. Just as providers of auto insurance
must assess the likelihood that a particular driver will cause an
accident, a D&O underwriter must determine the likelihood that a
particular management team will incur shareholder litigation. D&O
underwriters therefore ought to develop categories of high risk
corporate governance and low risk corporate governance just as car
insurance underwriters develop categories of high and low risk
drivers.76
Insurers may assess a prospective insured’s governance risk at the
time the D&O policy is first underwritten and then, on an ongoing
basis, at each annual renewal. Each year, the underwriter has the
option of refusing to renew a policy or of increasing a premium in
response to new information about a firm’s governance risk.
Similarly, because D&O policies are bought and sold in competitive
markets,77 prospective insureds have an opportunity to shop for the
most comprehensive and least expensive coverage. Each party to the
insurance arrangement is thus constrained by competition. A
company with very poor corporate governance may be unable to find
a willing underwriter, and an underwriter that prices its coverage very
high may be unable to find clients.
76

Governance risk may not be the only significant pricing point for the policy, but
other factors should wash out when compared across industries or across different
markets. If a particular industry, for example, is a likely target of shareholder
litigation, firms in that industry may pay relatively high premiums compared to
companies in other industries, but when compared to each other, pricing differences
should be expected largely to track governance risk. Industry newsletters generally
confirm this view. See, e.g., Lynna Goch, Falling Markets, Rising Risks, BEST’S
REVIEW, May 2001, at 56 (stating that: “D&O underwriters price policies based on
market capitalization of public companies…. Market conditions, type of risk,
industry and terms of the policy also affect the pricing.”); Lisa S. Howard,
European D&O Carriers Swearing Off ‘Drive-By’ Underwriting, NAT’L
UNDERWRITER, Dec. 2, 2002, at 20 (reporting that underwriters are once again
“digging deep to really analyze a company, its board structure, who the people are
and what their history is, what business they’re in, and how they conduct their
business.”).
77
Chubb and AIG are the leading primary underwriters in the U.S. market, with
Chubb, The Hartford, and XL Specialty leading in the excess limits market. See
Tillinghast 2003 Directors and Officers Liability Survey, supra note 35, at 7.
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The policy application is the first step in the underwriting process
and the insurer’s most basic tool to collect information concerning a
prospective insured.78 Application forms are required of both new
and renewal applicants, but the questions asked of each differ. New
applicants are asked whether they or any subsidiary corporation has
previously held a D&O policy and, if so, are asked for further details
concerning the identity of the previous insurer, the previous policy’s
limit and deductible, and the policy premium.79 This information may
allow the underwriter to make an initial assessment of the prospective
insured, using the reputation of the previous insurer to judge the
overall acceptability of the risk profile and the prior policy’s limits,
deductible, and premium as a proxy for the prior underwriter’s
ultimate assessment of the risk presented by the prospective insured.
The application form also asks new applicants about any prior claims
experience and whether any covered person has knowledge of acts or
omissions that may give rise to a claim.80 Both new and renewal
applicants are asked about recent or planned corporate restructurings,
including mergers & acquisitions activity, reorganizations, and sales
or distributions of businesses as well as plans to register an offering of
securities.81 New and renewal applicants are also asked to attach to
the application a list identifying all directors and officers, the
company’s most recent annual report, proxy notices, and recent
securities law filings as well as the company’s most recent interim
financial statements.82 The apparent purpose of these documents is to
enable the underwriter to perform due diligence on the insured, but
perhaps as importantly, these documents become incorporated into the
application which becomes the basis of the policy and, if they contain
a material misstatement or omission, a possible grounds for rescission
of the insurance policy.83 This feature of the application bonds a
78

See E-Mail from Joseph P. Monteleone, Vice President, Hartford Financial
Products, dated Feb. 16, 2005 (“completion of the application typically begins the
process and precedes any meetings between the prospective insured and the
underwriters”) [hereinafter Monteleone E-mail].
79
The Hartford, Proposal for Directors, Officers, and Company Liability Insurance,
Form DO 00 R288 05 1103, at item 4a [hereinafter, Hartford Specimen
Application].
80
Id., at item 5.
81
Id., at item 3.
82
Id., at item 7.
83
The Hartford Specimen Application provides in its boilerplate that “ALL WRITTEN
STATEMENTS AND MATERIALS FURNISHED TO THE INSURER IN CONJUNCTION WITH
THIS PROPOSAL FORM ARE HEREBY INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE INTO THIS
PROPOSAL AND MADE A PART HEREOF” and also that “THIS PROPOSAL SHALL BE THE
BASIS OF THE CONTRACT SHOULD A POLICY BE ISSUED.” Id. This language in the

application is immediately followed by state-specific fraud warnings.
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corporation to the credibility of all statements made in the application
and in any documents supplied to the insurer in connection with the
application. A corporation defeats the purpose of buying insurance if
it supplies false or misleading statements in connection with the
application since such statements could be used by the insurer to deny
coverage should a dispute later arise.
In many cases, the information supplied in the policy application
is supplemented by meetings during which prospective insured makes
presentations, described by participants as similar to an IPO roadshow,84 to prospective underwriters.85 These presentations showcase,
among other things, the prospective insured’s corporate governance.
Insurance brokers counsel clients to highlight positive governance
terms. One document I obtained from a broker advises prospective
insureds to discuss which outside auditing firm they use and to
disclose whether they also purchase non-audit services from the same
firm, essentially flagging a key corporate governance issue that arose
in the wake of the Enron collapse.86 The same document urges
corporations to emphasize any steps taken to improve its governance,
including “[p]articipating or completing any Corporate Governance
workshops,” and lists as other items to accentuate: the directors’
equity interest in the company, how directors are screened and
chosen, and whether the corporation has separated the roles of board
chair and chief executive officer, all items that have repeatedly arisen
in recent discussions of corporate governance.87

84

D&O Interview, Oct. 12, 2004 (transcript on file with author). These meetings
are organized by the company’s insurance broker and involve key company
officials, typically the CFO and occasionally the CEO, and one or more insurance
underwriters.
85
See Monteleone E-mail, supra note 78 (“In the case of a very large (e.g. Fortune
1000) risk with multiple layers of coverage being sought, there may be an in-person
meeting with the primary [insurer] and participation of excess insurers by
teleconference.”).
86
See “Company Facts” (unpublished industry document on file with author). An
introductory passage counsels:
The purpose of this list is to highlight all the important facts that we want to be
sure the underwriters know. If we can include any of the below items in our
discussions, we will have set the stage to deliver a risk profile that is desirable to
the underwriting community.
Id. See also Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and
Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1233, 1237-39 (2002) (discussing problems arising from accounting firms
that sell both auditing and advisory or consulting services).
87
Id. On the role of importance of these specific governance provisions, see
generally authors cited at supra note 8.
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Another document prepared by a D&O broker to help clients
prepare for these meetings advises on “Examples of Questions Being
Asked by D&O Underwriters” and counsels clients to prepare for
specific questions involving related party transactions,88 earnings
management,89 and takeover planning.90 In this document, the
company is asked to consider how it responds to pressures to hit
earnings targets and to address any company practices that might be
criticized as earnings management.91 The questions also highlight
general corporate governance issues including:
How does ‘bad news’ flow upward within the organization?
Does the corporate culture encourage such news to be
brought to the attention of senior management? Are
significant developments shared with the Board of Directors
as they become available? How does the company select a
new member
of the Board? How does the search process
take place?92
All of these questions go directly to the quality a firm’s corporate
governance. Earnings management and related-party transactions
may trigger either or both of securities litigation and derivative
lawsuits.93 Similarly, a board’s takeover planning may indicate
entrenchment and whether shareholder suits are likely to be brought
in connection with acquisition activity.94 Perhaps most significant,
however, is the question of intra-corporate information flows.
88

Unpublished industry document on file with author. Listed questions include:
“Does the Parent Company or any Subsidiary utilize any off balance sheet entities
for financial transactions? Does any member of the Board of Directors have any
outside affiliation or any common business interest with any major shareholder
(10% or more)? Within the past three years, did the Parent Company or any
Subsidiary engage in any related party transactions?”
89
Id. These questions include: “Has the Parent Company changed auditors or
restated its financials in the past three years? Please discuss the extent of the
experience of the Audit Committee Members. How often do they meet? Does the
Internal Audit Function have a direct report to the Audit Committee/Board of
Directors? Has your external auditor approved revenue recognition practices?
What is the length and scope of the company’s relationship with its outside
auditors? What percentage of fees has the company paid for auditing vs. consultant
fees? Are there any planned changes to this mix going forward? How does
management cope with pressure to meet ‘street’ expectations? Where might the
company be subject to criticism, if at all, for ‘earnings management’? How strong
are internal controls over the financial reporting process?”
90
See id., (asking: “How does the company review potential mergers and
acquisitions?”).
91
See id.
92
Id.
93
See Thompson & Sale, supra note 14.
94
See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 12.
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Although not tied to a specific shareholder claim, answers to this
question may indicate how potential problems are handled within the
organization and perhaps handled before they give rise to shareholder
litigation. In this way, the underwriter appears to be looking for clues
to the health of the organization that go beyond issues tied to specific
governance terms or types of litigation.
The insurer’s ability to interact with corporate officials, whether
when the policy is first underwritten or later, on an ongoing basis,
allows its assessment of corporate governance to be based on a
broader set of factors than would be revealed by charter terms or
public documents.95 When asked what governance factors seem to
matter most, one broker remarked to me:
Let me tell you something. I’ve seen over 50 models of all
different underwriters, and there’s one model that works and
it’s the best model: It’s the people. It’s simply the people.
Who are you dealing with? Who are they, and how do they
act? Are they96 in it for themselves or are they in it for their
shareholders?
The ability to take such intangible measures of governance quality
into account may provide the D&O insurer with a better perspective
on governance quality than outsiders with little or no access to
company officials. Underwriters have the ability to ask questions and
force prospective insureds to make representations and revelations
regarding their corporate governance that are not always available to
outsiders.
Moreover, because these representations can be
incorporated into the policy and, if false, form the basis of a rescission
action, they can be expected to have a level of credibility and candor
that most statements made by corporate officials do not.97 D&O
insurers thus form their estimate of an insured’s governance quality
on the basis of credible private information, unavailable to other
market participants.
In addition to this unique access to information, insurers have the
right incentives to perform a careful analysis of the prospective
insured’s governance risk. First, unlike other third party assessments
of corporate governance, including equity analysts, Institutional
Shareholder Services, and debt ratings agencies such as Moody's and
Standard & Poor's, insurers lose capital when they evaluate a
company incorrectly. Although it is possible to argue that other thirdparty corporate governance ratings also suffer when they are
incorrect, because these tend to operate on a fee-for-services model,
95

See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
D&O Interview, morning, Nov. 12, 2004, (transcript on file with author).
97
See supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing the incorporation of the
application into the policy, making it a basis for a rescission action).
96
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which would incur losses only if repeated inaccuracies threatened
their reputation, the sensitivity of these services to the cost of wrong
guesses is considerably less direct than an insurer’s.98 Second, unlike
mutual and pension funds and other diversified equity investors,
insurance companies cannot eliminate the non-systematic risk of firmspecific governance. To be sure, insurers build portfolios of insureds,
but insurance underwriting takes place in a competitive market and
not every insurer receives a portion of every risk. As a result, each
insurer’s portfolio of insureds is different, with insurers that are
skilled at distinguishing good and bad risks predictably building better
overall portfolios than those who are not.99 Because diversified
equity investors can eliminate these kinds of non-systematic risk,
there is less incentive for institutional investors to develop expertise
in actively distinguishing good and bad risks. Third, unlike bond
holders, who can control their downside risk through a combination of
contract, security, and priority, insurers have no security interest and
no system of priority to protect their rights if their risk assessments
are ultimately wrong.
Given the structure of their incentives and their unique access to
information, one can expect insurers to develop expertise in
distinguishing good and bad governance risks and to build these
assessments into their models for pricing D&O insurance. Simply
stated, how much a firm pays for a specific amount of D&O insurance
should provide a reliable outside assessment of its corporate
governance.
This relationship has a number of significant implications. First,
it could cause corporations to improve their overall governance
structure since worse governance leads to higher premiums—that is,
higher firm costs—which could be eliminated by improving
governance. This possibility is explored in Section B, below.
Second, even if corporations do not respond to differences in the cost
of D&O insurance pricing by optimizing their corporate governance,
the price that a firm pays for D&O insurance could convey an
important signal to investors and other market participants. This
possibility is explored in Section C, below.

98

Moreover, because their success is not tied directly to the ratings they generate,
but to the organizations that hire and pay them, ratings agencies’ evaluations can be
captured by other kinds agendas—e.g., either pro- or anti- regulatory—that do not
necessarily correspond to accurate evaluations of governance risk.
99
Again, this is the problem of adverse selection. See Akerloff, supra note 5.
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B. Incentive Effects
Businesses can improve their earnings in two ways: they can
increase revenues or cut costs. Insurance expenses, including D&O
premiums, are a source of cost. It follows, then, that corporations
could improve their earnings by cutting them and, in order to create a
competitive advantage, have ample incentive to do so. One way to
cut insurance costs, of course, is not to buy coverage. As discussed
above, however, corporations tend to purchase coverage even if it is
on the whole a negative net present value investment.100 Another way
that corporations might try to manage insurance cost is to eliminate
those governance features that lead to higher D&O premiums.
Building upon the hypothesis that insurers charge different rates
to companies with different corporate governance structures, D&O
premiums might provide an incentive for corporations to improve
corporate governance. By continually optimizing its governance
structure, a corporation ought to find that it pays consistently less for
D&O insurance than its competitors. Better corporate governance, in
other words, would mean lower D&O insurance costs and, therefore,
higher earnings and improved share values relative to competitors
who have not also optimized their governance structure.
One problem with this incentives story is that while D&O
insurance premiums are by no means small—the average premium for
U.S. for-profit companies was $1,237,000 in 2003101—they may not
be large enough to spur large changes in corporate governance
policies. If, as seems to be the case, the D&O insurance premium has
a relatively small overall effect on a corporation’s revenue stream, the
marginal costs of regularly reviewing and revising internal
governance policies—involving expensive legal and financial
advisors as well as the time and attention of the general counsel and
top level management—may easily outweigh the marginal benefits of
savings in policy premiums.
Also, insofar as the corporation’s reason for purchasing entitylevel coverage is based upon agency costs within the firm,102 it is
rather quixotic to expect corporations to cut D&O expenses in order
to increase earnings. It is always true that managers could make their
corporations run better by trimming agency costs. Managers could
improve the bottom line by cutting their salaries, giving back their
benefits packages, and firing their cronies. But it is also always true
that they will be generally disinclined to do so. In this way, just as it
100

See supra Part III.B.
Tillinghast 2003 Directors and Officers Liability Survey, supra note 35, at fig. 1
(reporting the median premium for these companies as $562,000).
102
See supra Part III.B.
101
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would not be surprising for D&O premiums to be higher for
companies with bad managers, it would not be surprising for bad
managers to refuse to be good in order to reduce an expense that is
ultimately borne by the shareholders. Any reduction in agency costs
would be better for shareholders, but if bad managers are not willing
to fix these problems generally, it is unlikely that the additional
corporate expense of marginally higher D&O premiums would spur
them do so.
In sum, in spite of the incentive effects of D&O premiums—
essentially, better companies pay less—one ought not to expect the
insurance premium alone to push companies to become better. The
marginal costs of continually optimizing corporate governance might
outweigh the marginal benefit of reduced D&O premiums. Moreover,
to the extent that D&O insurance purchases correspond to agency
costs, managers are unlikely to reduce their private benefits to save
costs borne by shareholders.

C. Signaling Effects
Even if the cost of D&O insurance does not provide a sufficiently
strong incentive to spur a corporation to optimize its corporate
governance, it may nevertheless signal important information to
market participants. First, the type of insurance package purchased
by a particular firm may signal information concerning the firm’s
likely motives in purchasing it and, by extension, some gauge of the
extent of agency costs within the organization. Second, following the
hypothesis that insurers develop expertise in separating good
governance risks in order to charge an appropriate premium, the price
of a firm’s D&O policy represents the insurer’s assessment of the
quality of the firm’s corporate governance. Equipped with the
information revealed by these signals, investors and other capital
market participants may react by discounting the shares of firms
revealed to have high agency costs or low-quality corporate
governance, ultimately creating another incentive (avoiding this
discount) for firms to improve their corporate governance.
The type of D&O coverage that a corporation purchases could
convey an important signal to the market. As discussed in Part III
above, D&O insurance may be intended to benefit either or both of
the corporation’s individual managers and the corporate entity itself.
Insofar as the insurance is intended to benefit individuals, it may be a
necessary feature of the benefits package required to attract top-level
talent to the firm. Entity-level coverage, however, may trace to
agency costs.

UNLEASHING A GATEKEEPER

29

Because it is simple to distinguish whether D&O coverage was
purchased to benefit individual managers, on the one hand, or the
corporate entity, on the other, a company’s D&O package can serve
as a simple proxy for agency costs. Side A coverage only benefits
individuals while Side B and Side C coverages only benefit the
corporate entity.103 A corporation purchasing only Side A coverage
may suffer less from agency costs than a firm that has bought a large
amount of Side B and Side C coverage as well.104 Market participants
could learn this information simply by reviewing the types of
coverage purchased by a particular insured.
Second, insofar as corporations buy individual coverage in order
to persuade directors to sit on their boards, the question arises as to
how much coverage these individuals require in order to accept the
job. Other things being equal, a relatively high level of coverage
(high limits, low retentions) signals individual discomfort with the
firm’s governance risk while, by contrast, low limits and high
retentions suggest that individual managers do not expect their firm to
generate significant liabilities from shareholder litigation. In this
way, the level of coverage alone may signal the managers’ own
assessment of governance risk.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the price the corporation
pays for its coverage conveys important information concerning the
corporation’s governance quality. If firms do not continually
optimize their corporate governance and firms with worse corporate
governance pay more for D&O insurance than firms with better
corporate governance, market participants could use D&O insurance
pricing as a proxy to evaluate a firm’s corporate governance. The
most obvious place to look for this information is the firm’s D&O
premium.
A company’s insurance premium could be converted into a proxy
for governance quality with a few relatively simple adjustments.
First, because insurance premiums depend in part on the coverage
103

See supra Part III.A.
My conversations with insurance industry participants revealed that some firms
do in fact purchase “Side A only coverage.” As one executive with a major D&O
underwriter described it to me:
[A] lot of companies are purchasing what we call Side A insurance only. …
[For] two reasons. Number one, the company is extremely well financed. We
don’t care about our own exposure as a company. You know we’ll handle that…
But we need to give some comfort to our outside board members in the event we
ever become insolvent. We don’t think we will but before someone serves on
our board they want to know about our D&O insurance.
D&O Interview, November 12, 2004, afternoon (transcript on file with author).
Accord Bailey, supra note 46.
104
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limits and the firm’s retention, premium data must be adjusted to
effective coverage amounts. This, however, would be a relatively
easy adjustment to make, given a broad data-set including insurance
premiums, limits, and retentions for many companies. Second, in
addition to these features of the insurance policy itself, insurance
premiums may correlate to other features of the corporation or its
business. Firms within a particular industry—an industry that has
attracted the attention of Eliot Spitzer, for example—may be subject
to systematically higher D&O rates than firms in other lines of
business with less industry-wide risk of shareholder litigation.105
However, this distortion too could be corrected by comparing D&O
insurance pricing across a set of firms within a specific industry in
order to identify norms and outliers. Finally, insurance premiums
may correlate to market capitalizations,106 whether because larger
firms attract more attention in shareholder litigation (perhaps because
they appear more often on the front page of the Wall Street Journal)
or because firms with high share prices have farther to fall in
measuring damages.107 Nevertheless, the influence of market
capitalization in insurance pricing also can be removed by comparing
firms with similar market capitalizations.
Thus, in spite of this noise in insurance prices, on the whole, a
firm’s premium for D&O insurance should convey important
information concerning the firm’s corporate governance. Most
basically, the more a firm pays, the worse its governance. Moreover,
because the insurer risks its own capital in making this assessment,
the D&O premium functions as a revealed preference and is therefore
likely to be a reliable indication of the insurer’s best assessment of the
insured’s governance quality. Understanding this, fund managers,
arbitrageurs, and other professional investors can be expected to build
these signals into their models of firm value. D&O insurance data
could thus provide another data point for analysts to crunch as they
seek to value firms. If D&O insurance policies reveal negative
105

Accord Howard, supra note 76, at 22 (quoting a managing director at Chubb as
stating that “if you happen to be in an industry group that insurers perceive as
extremely high risk at the moment, and you also happen to have your shares listed
[in the United States], then you’re going to be paying a hell of a lot more premium
than you did last year”).
106
See Goch, supra note 76. John Core and George Kaltchev have both found a
strong correlation between premium and market capitalization. See infra Part V.B.
107
This is true whether the theory of damages is the traditional “out of pocket”
measure—i.e., the difference between what the plaintiff received and what she
would have received had their been no fraudulent conduct—or “recessionary”
damages. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155
(1972) (out of pocket damages in securities fraud context); Randall v. Loftsgaarden,
478 U.S. 647, 659 (1986) (recessionary damages in securities fraud context).
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information—for example, high premiums or a high degree of entitylevel coverage—the corresponding negative impact in the equity and
credit markets may provide yet another incentive for firms to optimize
their corporate governance.

V.DISCLOSING D&O INSURANCE
In spite of the fact that the D&O insurer performs an essential
gatekeeping function in underwriting governance risks, signaling the
firm’s governance quality in the insurance premium, this signal is not,
in fact, reaching the market. Current U.S. law does not require the
disclosure of D&O policy details although other countries, notably
Canada, do. This Part explores the approach of each country’s
securities regulators to D&O policy details and argues ultimately that
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission should require
registrants to disclose details concerning their D&O policies on an
annual basis.
A. D&O Disclosure Obligations in the United States
U.S. law does not require disclosure of D&O policy details, and
most U.S. companies do not in fact disclose the details of their D&O
policies. SEC rule-making is particularly interesting on this point
because the SEC’s public policy pronouncements regarding
indemnification are inconsistent with its position on insurance in spite
of the fact that indemnification and insurance raise many of the same
issues.
Congress has not addressed the issues raised by management
indemnification and insurance, but the SEC, following Congress’s
stated intent of inducing compliance with the securities laws, has
taken a firm position against the indemnification of officers and
directors for securities law violations.108 The SEC requires that all
registrants under the Securities Act of 1933 include the following
language in their registration statements:
Insofar as indemnification for liabilities arising under the
Securities Act of 1933 may be permitted to directors, officers
and controlling persons of the registrant pursuant to the
foregoing provisions, or otherwise, the registrant has been
108
H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 5, 9 (1933); S. Rep. No. 47, 73d Cong.,
1st Sess. 5 (1933) (stating an intent “to impose a duty of competence as well as
innocence” in the Securities Act of 1933). See generally James M. Landis, The
Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29 (1959)
(providing a personal and anecdotal account of the passage of the Securities Act).
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advised that in the opinion of the Securities and Exchange
Commission such indemnification is against public policy
as
expressed in the Act and is, therefore, unenforceable.109
The SEC’s position on indemnification is rooted in the view that
spreading the cost of legal sanction renders managers less likely to
comply with the law.110 Because insuring directors and officers
against these costs would seem to implicate precisely the same policy
concerns as indemnifying them, it would be reasonable to suppose
that the SEC similarly opposes D&O insurance. This supposition,
however, appears to be incorrect.
The SEC takes a milder position on D&O insurance than it takes
on indemnification. The SEC has not declared insurance against
securities law liabilities to be a violation of public policy. In fact, the
SEC has arguably endorsed the corporate purchase of D&O
insurance, stating that the maintenance of a D&O policy, even when
paid for by the company, will not bar acceleration of a registration
statement.111 Moreover, unlike the harsh language imposed on
109

Regulation S-K, item 510, 17 C.F.R. §229.510 (requiring that this statement be
included in the registration statements of registrants not requesting acceleration of
effectiveness). For registrants requesting acceleration of the effective date, the
same statement is required as well as the following additional language:
In the event that a claim for indemnification against such liabilities (other than
the payment by the registrant of expenses incurred or paid by a director, officer
or controlling person of the registrant in the successful defense of any action, suit
or proceeding) is asserted by such director, officer or controlling person in
connection with the securities being registered, the registrant will, unless in the
opinion of its counsel the matter has been settled by controlling precedent,
submit to a court of appropriate jurisdiction the question whether such
indemnification by it is against public policy as expressed in the Act and will be
governed by the final adjudication of such issue.
Regulation S-K, item 512(h), 17 C.F.R. §229.512(h). These line-item disclosures
are triggered in each of the major forms governing the registration of securities.
See, e.g., Forms S-1, S-2, S-3, S-4, S-8 and S-11.
110
See LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATIONS, 3d § 2.C.2.
(2004) (stating basis of avoiding frustration of the in terrorem effect of the
Securities Act). See also Globus v. Law Res. Serv. Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288-89
(2d Cir. 1969), (concurring with SEC position and denying indemnification on the
view that liability “was designed not so much to compensate the defrauded
purchaser as to ... deter negligence”) cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970). Similarly,
public policy has been held to prevent indemnification under other federal statutes.
See, e.g., Sequa Corp. v. Gelmin, 851 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y., 1993)
(indemnification for RICO liability against public policy).
111
17 C.F.R. 230.461(c) ( “Insurance against liabilities arising under the Act,
whether the cost of insurance is borne by the registrant, the insured or some other
person, will not be considered a bar to acceleration….”). The Commission does,
however, consider registered investment companies a special case, requiring greater
scrutiny of insurance arrangements. Id.; see also Investment Companies and
Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(h) (prohibiting “any provision which protects ...
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registrants adopting indemnification provisions, the SEC requires
only that the existence and “general effect” of D&O insurance
policies be disclosed.112
Considering that insurance and
indemnification raise the same policy concerns,113 the maintenance of
distinct positions seems inconsistent, and in any event, has never been
explained by the SEC.114
The regulation that requires registrants to disclose the existence
of D&O insurance does not require the disclosure of any policy
details. Item 702 of Regulation S-K requires that registrants:
[s]tate the general effect of any statute, charter provisions,
by-laws, contract or other arrangements under which any
controlling persons, director or officer of the registrant is
insured or indemnified in any manner
against liability which
he may incur in his capacity as such.115
Although the “general effect” of D&O insurance may be read to
require some discussion of policy details, registrants generally
provide nothing more than an opaque statement that coverage will be
any director or officers of [a registered investment company] against ... willful
misfeasance, bad faith, gross negligence or reckless disregard of ... duties”).
112
See Regulation S-K, item 702, 17 CFR §229.702. This disclosure is triggered,
like the disclosures required by items 510 and 512(h), by each of the major forms
governing the registration of securities. See, e.g., Forms S-1, S-2, S-3, S-4, S-8 and
S-11.
113
Interestingly, the Commission originally treated insurance and indemnification
together in item 510 of Regulation S-K, requiring disclosure of insurance
arrangements in sub-section of the provision mandating inclusion of the policy
statement on indemnification. See SEC Release 33-6383, 1982 WL 90370, at *14,
*19, *100-101, and *115 (splitting what was then S-K 510(a) and (b) into what is
now S-K 510 and 702, respectively).
114
See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 110, at § 2.C.2., n.83 (“The Commission
policy on indemnification is hardly a jewel of consistency. It applies solely to
indemnification by registrants and not to indemnification by insurers or by other
third parties.”); Milton P. Kroll, Some Reflections on Indemnification Provisions
and S.E.C. Liability Insurance In Light of BarChris and Globus, 24 BUS. LAW. 681,
687-92 (1969) (reviewing SEC policies on indemnification and insurance). The
inconsistencies in the SEC’s position are several. On its face, it applies only to
violations of the Securities Act, not the Securities Exchange Act, and therefore
captures disclosure violations in connection with securities issuance but not to
securities fraud under section 10b-5, a distinction for which the basis is unclear.
Furthermore, the bar on indemnification of securities law liabilities has been
interpreted by courts not to apply to defense costs or settlement. See, e.g., Raychem
Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 853 F. Supp. 1170 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that
indemnification of settlement is not against public policy); Goldstein v Alodex
Corp., 409 F. Supp. 1201 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (ruling that indemnification of defense
costs is not against public policy). Since most securities claims are settled, these
exceptions seem to swallow the rule.
115
17 CFR §229.702.
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available, subject to unstated limits, to cover certain liabilities arising
from the directors’ or officers’ conduct as such.116 By granting
effectiveness to these registration statements, the SEC effectively
accepts such non-descriptive language in fulfillment of the required
disclosure.
The SEC could require much more detail. The SEC could, for
example, treat D&O insurance as a “material contract” and require
that policies be filed as an exhibit to the registration statement.117 It
could also treat D&O insurance as an aspect of executive
compensation, triggering a fulsome description of policy features
including the cost and value of the policy, as it does in the case of life
insurance. 118 However, the SEC has made neither of these choices,
instead treating D&O insurance as a matter distinct from executive
compensation and thereby minimizing the required disclosure of
policy details.119
It is puzzling, given both the SEC’s strident position on
indemnification and the valuable information that D&O policy details
may convey, why the SEC does not require disclosure of registrants’
D&O policy premiums, limits, and retentions. This may seem
especially strange considering the fact, explored in the next section,

116
For example, in its registration statement, Yankee Candle made the following
statement:
Policies of insurance are maintained by Yankee Candle under which its directors
and officers are insured, within the limits and subject to the limitations of the
policies, against certain expenses in connection with the defense of, and certain
liabilities which might be imposed as a result of, actions, suits or proceedings to
which they are parties by reason of being or having been such directors or
officers.
Amended Registration Statement on Form S-3 of Yankee Candle Co., Inc., (Apr.
22, 2002) at II-1.
117
See Regulation S-K item 601(b)(10), 17 C.F.R. §229.601 (requiring that certain
“Material Contracts” be filed as exhibits to the registrants public filings).
118
See, e.g., Regulation S-K item 402(b)(2)(iv)(E), 17 C.F.R. §402 (requiring
disclosure of dollar value of life insurance provided by the corporation to its
executives and the premiums paid by the corporation).
119
The SEC has expressly stated that it will not treat D&O insurance as a form of
executive compensation.
Premiums paid for liability insurance for officers and directors and benefits paid
under such insurance plans are not forms of remuneration to the extent that the
insurance plan is intended to relieve officers and directors of liability relating to
their job performance.
1978 SEC LEXIS 2277 (1978) (release regarding “Disclosure of Management
Remuneration”). In taking this position, the SEC essentially follows the IRS, which
also does not treat D&O insurance as executive compensation. See KNEPPER &
BAILEY, supra note 18, at §22.22.
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that Canadian securities regulators require disclosure of precisely
these items.

B. A Canadian Comparison
Unlike their counterparts in the United States, Canadian securities
regulators do require disclosure of D&O insurance details. Public
companies in Canada must disclose basic information concerning
their D&O insurance policies, including coverage limits and
premiums, in their proxy filings and registration statements.120 This
provides the opportunity to conduct a natural experiment. Can the
information disclosed in these Canadian filings be used to establish a
link between corporate governance and D&O insurance? A handful
of economists have tested this data, but legal differences between the
two countries make it difficult to import conclusions from Canada or
any foreign jurisdiction to American corporate governance.121
Professor Core has preformed the leading study examining
Canadian data to determine whether D&O premiums can be related to
corporate governance variables.122
Hypothesizing that D&O
premiums would be a function both of business-specific risk factors
and governance-related risk factors, Core separated proxy variables
relating to each.123 Grouping measures of ownership structure, board
120
See Ontario Securities Commission, Form 30. This information is publicly
available on the Ontario Securities Commission’s online database of public filings.
See System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval (“SEDAR”), available
online at http://www.sedar.com.
Canadian corporations are given express
permission to purchase D&O insurance under the Canadian Business Corporations
Act. R.S.C., ch. C-44, § 124(6) (2004) (“A corporation may purchase and maintain
insurance for the benefit of an[officer or director] against any liability incurred by
the individual … in the individual’s capacity as a director or officer of the
corporation…”).
121
Although the legal systems of the U.S. and Canada are broadly similar, Canada is
a considerably less favorable environment for entrepreneurial plaintiffs lawyers.
Canada retains the English “loser pays” system, increasing the risk borne by the
plaintiffs’ lawyers. As a result, contingent fees are used less often and, when they
are used, are subject to a reasonableness standard. Class actions and derivative suits
are filed less often, perhaps because punitive damages are rarely awarded. See, e.g.,
Ronald J. Daniels & Susan M. Hutton, The Capricious Cushion: The Implications of
the Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance Crisis on Canadian Corporate
Governance, 22 CANADIAN BUS. LAW J. 182 (1993).
122
See John E. Core, The Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance Premium: An Outside
Assessment of the Quality of Corporate Governance, 16 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 449
(2000).
123
Id., at 454 (“a firm’s D&O premium is hypothesized to be a function of both the
quality of its corporate governance and its business risk”).

UNLEASHING A GATEKEEPER

36

size, and management entrenchment together as indicators of
“governance quality” and firm size, financial performance, and U.S.
exchange listing as proxies for “business risk,”124 Core regressed each
variable against D&O premiums, finding approximately half of the
governance quality variables to be statistically significant, while each
of the business risk variables was statistically significant.125
Significant governance quality variables—including insider stock
ownership and voting control, director independence, and executive
employment contracts126—enabled Core ultimately to conclude that
Canadian data supports an association between D&O premiums and
governance quality.127
One of the variables Core found to be most significant, however,
underscores the study’s inherent limitations. If a Canadian firm is
also listed on a U.S. exchange, exposing it to U.S. securities litigation,
the firm has significantly higher D&O premiums. This emphasizes
the difference between U.S. and Canadian liability risks. At least
with regard to shareholder litigation, and perhaps representative
litigation generally, the legal systems between the two countries are
different enough to make cross-country comparisons somewhat
tenuous. Thus, although Core’s study supports the link between
corporate governance and D&O insurance predicted by this Essay,
without U.S. data it cannot support a firm conclusion.
In a recent working paper, Professor Kaltchev attempts to
develop his own U.S. data set from proprietary and confidential
information supplied by two insurance brokerage firms.128 Kaltchev’s
data set includes information on insurance limits and retentions—that
is, data on the amount of D&O insurance purchased—for almost 300
124

Id., at 457-462.
These proxies included management experience (the longer the manager has
been on the board, the lower the firm’s litigation risk), financial performance (the
worse the firm’s return on equity, the worse its litigation risk), size (greater total
assets, greater risk), prior litigation (firms with a history of litigation are worse
litigation risks), and U.S. operations or U.S. listing (both of which increased
litigation risk).
126
Id., at 463-466. Core notes that all governance variables have the predicted sign
and that they add explanatory power to the model as a group, even if only four of
nine are individually significant. Id., at 468.
127
See id., at 451 (“The results indicate that D&O premiums are significantly higher
when inside control of share votes is greater, when inside ownership is lower, when
the board is comprised of fewer outside directors, when the CEO has appointed
more of the outside directors, and when insider officers have employment
contracts.”)
128
George D. Kaltchev, The Demand For Directors’ and Officers’ Liability
Insurance By US Companies, 34 (July 2004) (describing the unique data set
consisting of approximately 300 U.S. companies spanning the period 1997-2003).
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companies, which he has used to test hypotheses for why companies
purchase D&O insurance.129 Perhaps unsurprisingly, Kaltchev finds
the best predictor of D&O limits is the insured company’s market
capitalization.130 After size, the leading indicators of insurance
amounts seem to be returns, with larger returns on assets tending to
produce lower insurance limits.131 This could be taken to suggest that
better managers are less likely to insist on high levels of D&O
insurance or, relatedly, that companies that perform better are less
likely to be sued. Alternately, an inverse relationship between returns
and coverage limits may simply indicate that firms with high cash
flows can more easily self-insure against litigation risk. Kaltchev’s
findings also support a significant relationship between indicators of
financial health, as indicated by leverage and volatility, and D&O
coverage limits: the higher a company’s leverage and volatility, the
more insurance it buys. Of the corporate governance variables tested,
it is worth noting that companies that have not split the chief
executive and chairperson of the board functions tend to buy more
D&O insurance and that director and officer ownership of firm stock
correlates to lower policy limits.132
A significant weakness of the Kaltchev study, however, is that it
lacks information on insurance pricing. Because almost every firm
purchases D&O insurance and because losses correlate to size,
insurance pricing is more likely to be sensitive to governance
variables than coverage limits or overall demand. Kaltchev was
unable to produce this data from his confidential U.S. sources while
Core, in spite of access to pricing information through Canadian
firms’ proxy statements, was subject to limitations in making
comparisons across legal systems that, at least on the issue of
shareholder litigation, are significantly different. Thus, the only way
to provide researchers and market participants with the information
embedded in the D&O insurance premium may be to mandate
disclosure of such data in U.S. securities law. This is the solution
proposed in the next section.
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Id.
Id., at 52 (noting that “[the market value of firm equity] appears to be directly
related to limits, as a measure of the potential size of loss”). This is as one would
expect since the larger the market capitalization, the greater the potential damages
in shareholder litigation.
131
Id.
132
Id., at 36 (arguing that this confirms “the hypothesis that higher managerial
ownership aligns the interests of shareholders and managers and that insurance and
ownership are … substitutes”). But see Core, supra note 122, at tbl. 2 (finding, in
Canadian data set, that separation between chief executive and chairperson roles
does not seem to affect premiums).
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C. The SEC Should Mandate Disclosure of D&O Insurance Details
The law should be changed to require disclosure of greater detail
concerning a company’s D&O policies. In addition to disclosing the
existence of a policy, companies should be required to disclose the
identity of the insurer, the limits and retention under each side type of
coverage (Side A, B, and C), and perhaps most importantly, the D&O
premium. These disclosures should be required on an annual basis.
Each of these additional disclosures could provide valuable
information that is currently unavailable to capital market
participants.
This Essay has argued that a firm’s D&O insurance premium is
related to its governance quality and should therefore convey an
important signal concerning the value of the firm’s corporate
governance. Requiring disclosure of the firm’s D&O insurance
premium on an annual basis would thus provide investors with
valuable information, alerting them to changes in the governance risk
of the firm. If, for example, a firm’s D&O insurance significantly
increased in a year in which similarly situated firms in the same
industry experience no change in their premiums, investors would be
put on notice that something significant had changed at the firm.
Moreover, because the governance assessment implicit on the
insurance premium is based on private information provided to the
D&O insurer—information that the insurer, unlike equity analysts
operating under Regulation FD, is under no obligation to share with
other market participants—the signal offered by a change in insurance
premiums may alert investors to a piece of information that, because
it is not public, is otherwise unavailable to them.133
Details on the amount of D&O insurance purchased—that is, the
company’s policy limits and retentions—would provide several vital
pieces of information. First, without information on the amount of
insurance purchased, data on premiums would be too noisy to be
meaningful. Information on limits and retentions is necessary to
specify precisely what the company is paying for and to enable
comparisons across different firms buying similar amounts of
coverage. Moreover, requiring information about the amount of
coverage under each type of coverage—that is, Side A, B, and C—
would provide additional signals to the market. As described above,
Side A coverage is the only form of coverage that benefits officers
and directors individually. The amount of Side A coverage purchased
by a firm could thus convey an important signal about the confidence
133
17 C.F.R. 243 (2001) (preventing selective disclosure of material nonpublic
information).
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of its managers regarding the liability risks they expect to face.
Sanguine managers may require their firms to purchase less coverage.
As a result, other things being equal, a firm purchasing lower amounts
of Side A insurance may tend to pose less risk of shareholder
litigation. Unlike Side A coverage, Side B and Side C coverages
benefit the company only and, as described above, may be rooted in
managerial agency costs. As a result, a company purchasing large
amounts of coverage under Sides B and C sends a signal not only that
its managers believe the firm presents a relatively large risk of
shareholder litigation but also that it has the kind of managers who
would rather waste corporate assets in a negative net present value
investment than put their personal compensation packages at risk by
allowing the firm to self-insure against shareholder litigation.
Finally, the identity of the D&O insurer would provide valuable
information about the reputation of the gatekeeper. Investors may
draw different conclusions if, for example, a company’s primary
D&O insurer is a market leader in D&O insurance versus an
unknown, cut-rate insurer. The cut-rate insurer may have an incentive
to lower premiums irrespective of governance risk in order to capture
greater market share. Although this will be a losing strategy in the
long run, upstart firms may try it in the short run to establish a set of
clients, hoping to make up the increased risk with higher premiums in
the future. More directly, some insurers may develop a reputation for
developing better risk pools than others with the result that the
companies they underwrite will be viewed by investors as better
governance risks.
Given the potential value of this new information to market
participants, the SEC should change the relevant regulations to cause
corporations to provide it. This would be a technically simple matter.
The Commission could amend Regulation S-K item 702 to mandate,
instead of a weak statement of the “general effect” of insurance
arrangements, explicit disclosure of the registrant’s D&O premium,
its limits and retentions under each type of coverage, and the identity
of the registrant’s primary D&O insurance carrier. Then, in order to
make this disclosure annual, the Commission could add a cross
reference in Form 10-K to item 702, thereby requiring registrants to
disclose detailed information on D&O insurance when they file their
annual reports.
Although such modifications would be technically simple, the
Commission may encounter political resistance to this change, both
from registrants and insurers. Their most likely argument is that
mandating disclosure of D&O insurance details will encourage the
filing of non-meritorious lawsuits by plaintiffs’ lawyers eager to reach
insurance assets. It is unlikely, however, that plaintiffs’ lawyers will
learn much from these additional disclosures that they did not already
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know or suspect. After all, it is no secret that over 95% of U.S.
companies carry D&O insurance and that average limits for
companies with assets in excess of $100 million are in the tens of
millions of dollars.134 Plaintiffs’ lawyers know this and, because they
make a living out of it, can be expected to estimate a company’s
likely coverage within a fairly accurate range. Moreover, once a
claim arises, plaintiffs’ lawyers can be expected to hone their estimate
of a defendant company’s D&O coverage to such a degree that
requiring disclosure of this information on an annual basis is unlikely
to alter the dynamics of either filing or settlement.
There may, however, be some subtext to this and other objections
of both registrants and the insurance industry. Registrants may resist
the disclosure of D&O insurance data because, as described above, it
threatens to reveal new information about the level of agency costs at
the firm. Yet this is precisely why the SEC should require it.
Moreover, not every company will suffer from these disclosures.
There are likely to be companies, for example, that pay relatively little
in D&O premiums or that purchase only Side A coverage, both of
which signal good governance and low agency costs. Unmasking this
information would provide positive information about these firms
and, potentially, result in a positive adjustment in their share value. In
addition, disclosure of the amount that all registrants pay for D&O
coverage may make the market for D&O insurance more competitive.
If, when renewing its policy, a company is able to cite the lower
premiums paid by several of its competitors, the company may be in a
position to bargain for a lower premium itself. This improved
transparency would thus benefit all companies in that market.135
Making the market for D&O coverage more competitive may be
precisely what the insurance industry is afraid of. Insurance industry
objections to mandatory disclosure of D&O policy details may thus
be rooted in the view that additional disclosure will drive down rates
and make it even more difficult for insurers to make a profit from
their professional liability lines. But this again is a strange objection
since it is rooted in inefficiencies and market power. From a public
policy perspective, these are problems to be solved, not rights to be
protected, and mandating disclosure of D&O premiums may be a step
in the direction of solving them.
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Tillinghast 2003 Directors and Officers Liability Survey, supra note 35, at fig. 3
and 5.
135
It would not benefit insurance brokers, however, who as intermediaries in these
transactions purport to add value through their special knowledge and expertise of
the marketplace. If this information was made publicly available, the need for
intermediaries would be reduced. Although the brokers may object, it is not clear
that this is not in fact another benefit of disclosure.
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The likely objections to mandatory disclosure of D&O insurance
details from registrants and insurance companies are, at any rate, not
highly principled. The basic benefit of this disclosure is improvement
of capital market efficiency through the signaling effects provided by
D&O policy details. A possible side-benefit of mandatory disclosure
of this information is the improvement of product market efficiency
for this type of insurance. The Commission thus has strong
arguments at its disposal to answer the narrow, self-interested
objections of registrants and the insurance industry. Moreover, the
modification to the existing regime of securities regulation would be
technically simple to accomplish. Because the benefits thus appear to
overwhelm the costs, the SEC should change the law to mandate the
disclosure of D&O policy details in annual filings.

VI.SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This Essay has explored the connection between corporate
governance and D&O insurance. From the fact that D&O insurers act
as gatekeepers and guarantors, screening and pricing corporate
governance risks to maintain the profitability of their risk pools, this
Essay has advanced the hypothesis that, other things being equal,
firms with relatively worse corporate governance pay higher D&O
premiums. This hypothesis thus implies that a company’s D&O
insurance premium would signal important information concerning a
firm’s governance quality to investors and other capital market
participants. Unfortunately, the signal is not being sent. Corporations
lack the incentive to produce this disclosure themselves, and the SEC
currently does not require registrants to provide this information. As
a result, this Essay has advocated a change to U.S. securities
regulation, making disclosure of D&O policy details—specifically
premiums, limits and retentions under each type of insurance, as well
as the identity of the insurer—mandatory. Because such disclosure
would improve the “total mix” of information in the capital markets,
would cost very little to implement, and does not give rise to a
principled objection, this Essay urges the Commission to adopt this
proposed reform as soon as possible.

